According to the Kurdish news outlet Rudaw, Mir Hossein Mousavi—the leader of Iran’s opposition “Green Movement”—is accusing President Ahmadinejad’s administration of “suspending government projects” pending the arrival of the 12^th Imam, the Mahdi.  “Some people believe Mahdi will come in the next six months or next year. That is why the government has stopped working on several industrial, as well as water and energy projects,” Mousavi ridiculed. “They paralyze the economy on the prextext of Mahdi’s coming.” Mousavi also claimed that such “superstitious beliefs were growing within the ruling elite” and that “his supporters had increased into the military circles [sic] including high ranking offiicals of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps."
Observations:
1)  It has become commonplace to accuse “hardline” elements within the Islamic Republic government of such eschatological inanity—but it would be nice to have some proof thereof.  Mousavi may simply be trying to curry favor with secular allies, within and outside Iran, over against the admittedly-apocalpytic-minded Ahmadinejad. 
2)  Ditto for the charge that Mahdist expectations are running rampant in other sectors of the regime.  How about a fatwa, article, sermon text or even purloined email to back up such a charge? Preferably something on Mesbah-Yazdi’s personal stationery.
3)  Which sector of the “ruling elite” is most prone to this alleged Mahdist hysteria? Ahmadinejad’s populist clique?  The “hardline,” “reformist,” or irredentist ayatollahs?  The Hujjatiyeh organization? After all, remember, accusing Shi`is of belief in the Mahdi’s return is like accusing Christians of belief in Jesus’ return—it may alarm secularists, but it’s not exactly abnormal. 
4)  Due to imprecision on the part of either the Rudaw reporter or Mousavi himself, it’s unclear whether “his supporters” refers to those of Mousavi, Ahmadinejad or the Mahdi himself.  It seems to refer to Mousavi, in which case Tehran is no doubt nervous that opposition to Ahmadinejad, and thus perhaps also to Supreme Leader Khameini, would be on the rise within the vilayet-i faqih’s Praetorian Guard.  
5) Somehow I doubt that the nuclear weapons industry has seen much of a slowdown.... 

According to a story this week by the Islamic Republic of Iran’s AhlulBayt News agency, celebrations of the 12^th Imam’s birthday have now spread to Liverpool, England.  Such festivities honoring the occulted Muhammad al-Mahdi’s birthday, and not his death, remind true believers that he’s only sleeping and that it won’t be long until his return, which could happen any time at all.  However, since the last imam  disappeared over a millennium ago, telling his follower that "you won’t see me" until you come together and get back to the pure faith and community of the early Muslim umma, he’s been something of a nowhere man, and queries directed at him usually get no reply at all (except perhaps when made by Ahmadinejad).   When the Mahdi does come, he will lead an Islamic revolution, getting rid of the Western global taxman. Until then, Twelver Shi`is will just have to let it be.  Insha’allah, he won’t come in through the Jamkaran bathroom window, which while not long might constitute somewhat of a winding road to reappearance.  Remember, all things must pass—including, thankfully for the reader, this post (although I could go on, and on….). 

This past week PBS' Frontline ran a dispatch by Babak Sarfaraz, "The Hidden Imam and His Cult," which while showing flashes of astute analysis also makes a number of questionable statements about Mahdism in Iran.  For example, Sarfaraz claims that "the cult of Mahdi...had never become a full-fledged mass movement until the last 20 years."  He also refers to the "ultra reactionary millennialist Hojjatieh [sic] Society." Twelver Shi`ism--with its core belief in the occultation of the 12th Imam who will return as the eschatological Mahdi--has been the majority religion of Iran since the early 1500s, and mass movements motivated by a perceived imminent Mahdist arrival have occurred many times in the last 500 years (most notably during the reign of the Safavids, in the early 16th century; and during the outbreak of the Babi/Baha'i movement, during the late 19th century).  Working for Frontline (and being, presumably, Iranian) does not absolve one from knowing the history of the faith and region upon which one is reporting.  As for the Hojjatiyeh: that organization, if it still even exists in Iran, is neither “ultra reactionary” (a term that should be banned from liberal outlets like PBS for overuse) nor any more millennialist than Twelver Shi`ism in general. Anjuman-i Hujjatiyah was founded in the 1950s to reconvert wayward Baha’is to Shi`i Islam, and was dissolved by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1983 because of insufficient support for the vilayet-i faqih (“rule of the jurisprudents”). The organization is, if anything, less millennialist than mainstream Twelver Shi`ism. (As I explain here, in a lecture at the Hudson Institute in June 2010).

Most interesting are two allegations by Sarfaraz. The first is that "by 2008, the newspapers were replete with reports of self-procalimed "Mahdis" announcing their reappearance and offering various prophesies or end-of-the-world scenarios. Every week, someone claimed to be the Mahdi or to be in special communion with him." And the second is this: "What finally convinced Khamenei that the Mahdaviat movement had gone far enough was last year's presidential election and its aftermath. For instead of aligning closer to the Supreme Leader, the ungrateful and ambitious president has decided to become a major rival to his erstwhile benefactor." It would be nice to see some corroboration for the claims of multiple mutamahdis (“false mahdis”), but after going to Iran in 2008 I opined that such would be the case. As for the alleged Ahmadinejad-Khamenei rivalry: Western caricatures aside, it’s very likely that the President of Iran is actually more popular in his own country now than the Supreme Leader, and has been since last summer’s post-election disputes. Ahmadinejad’s popular Islam, his own personal popularity (especially among the lower classes and in rural areas) and his Iran-Iraq War veteran status may put in in a pivotal position should the Iranian military decide to assume power from the ayatollahs.

According to a story in the VOA yesterday "Insurgents Behead 6 Police in Afghanistan" (http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/NATO-Insurgents-Behead-6-Police-in-Afghanistan-98910339.html). 
This took place in northern Baghlan province, in the  country's northeast.  NATO "condemned the incident as 'brutal' and 'barbaric.'"  Yet, as is always the case with Muslim "insurgents" separating victims' heads from their bodies, no mention is ever made that the Qur'an mandates such a fate for "unbelievers" on the battlefield--as I explained at length, five years ago, in my Middle East Quarterly article "Beheading in the Name of Islam" (http://www.meforum.org/713/beheading-in-the-name-of-islam).  The Obama Administration can bury its collective head in the sand all it wants, but the hard fact will remain that according to scripture and tradition of the world's second-largest religion, decapitation of Islam's enemies is fully legitimate. 

SecState Clinton is "On the Record" with Greta Van Susteren (Fox News Channel) right now (evening of July 19).  She's repeating the conventional wisdom that Usama bin Ladin is somewhere in Pakistan and that someone in the Pakistani government knows his location.  What's that definition of insanity--doing the same thing over and over and expecting a different result?  What's the syndrome when you say the same thing repeatedly, and hope that such ritual incantation will shape reality?  Either magic or propaganda, methinks. Or perhaps self-delusion.
Bin Ladin is in Iran, and likely has been for years.  But admitting that would require a whole new constellation of thought, and the ideologically-blinkered Obama administration is not about to go there.